The great exit

College-educated mothers of young children leaving the labor force.

October 1, 2025

The Covid-19 pandemic severely disrupted the childcare sector. Daycare operations shut down while schools went online. Many women cut their work hours or left the labor force to care for their children. They saw little choice.

Then funds from the federal government stabilized the sector.1 Companies, too, shifted online, providing remote work opportunities that brought many back into the labor force. Women with young children drove record participation of prime-age women in the US economy.2

Those gains are now reversing. Since late 2023, women with young children have been leaving the labor force. Those with a college degree or higher are driving those losses. Over the same period, men with young children have increased their participation in the labor force.

Labor markets are expected to be tight in the years ahead due to retiring baby boomers, low birth rates and curbs on immigration. The childcare crisis is adding additional stress to the labor supply. Employers are currently losing talent; as a result, the US economy will grow more slowly.

Labor shortages worsen

The pandemic shutdowns temporarily crippled the childcare sector. One good measure for supply in the sector is employment in childcare services from the Current Employment Statistics (CES). This is the formal workforce that enables many workers with children to provide for their families.

Employment collapsed in March 2020; it lost 34% of all jobs. It started to recover with the CARES Act of 2020, expansions in December 2020 and large infusions via the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) in April 2021.

Those funds boosted employment in the sector. The employment trend came close to matching the pre-pandemic trend, but the bulk of the funds lapsed in October 2023. Some states provided additional funds, but the total investments have not been enough to fill the gaps. As a result, employment in childcare has stagnated since early 2024 (see Chart 1 below). 

The “childcare cliff” that many predicted has become more of a plateau. But that plateau shows a sector in crisis. If the employment trend pre-pandemic or from 2021-2023 continued, there would be more than 100,000 additional jobs in the sector today.

The childcare sector has long faced supply-side shortages. Nationwide, over one-quarter of children do not have access to care within a reasonable distance from home.3 Many parents face long waiting lists. In August, one organization told the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas that over 11,000 children were on the childcare waitlist in the communities they serve.4

Many state and local governments, across the political spectrum, are seeking ways to shore up the childcare sector. Among other policies, many are levying childcare-specific taxes and tax credits to boost local economies and help businesses attract and retain workers.5

Chart 1: Childcare sector short more than 100,000 jobs compared to trends

Number, millions, SA

Source: KPMG Economics, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Haver Analytics Note: The American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) disbursed funds via Child Care Stabilization Grants and the Child Care and Development Block Grant

High turnover rates

Retaining childcare workers remains a challenge. Turnover is high due to low wages.6 That harms children’s health, safety and development. The inflation-adjusted median wage for childcare workers was $15.90 per hour in August. That is not enough to cover the basic cost of living in most US counties.7

Recent policy shifts are likely to contribute to supply-side shortages. An estimated one-fifth of childcare workers overall are immigrants, including one-fourth in center-based daycares.8 Anecdotal data suggest immigration restrictions are already affecting the supply side.9

Higher inflation is another challenge; it adds to the costs of running a childcare center. Many diapers, wipes, toys, supplies and food, especially for young children, are imported and subject to tariffs and the shift in trade policy. Utilities and insurance costs are rising. Most childcare providers operate as small businesses with thin, if any, margins.10 Higher prices could force centers to close, making supply shortages even worse.

Rapidly increasing childcare prices reveal supply and demand imbalances

These supply-side shortages are clashing with elevated demand. Though many believe lower fertility rates mean less demand for childcare, the number of births actually increased in 2024 compared to 2023.11 Millennials (mostly in their 30s) and Generation Z (mostly in their 20s) are now starting families, which is increasing the demand for childcare.

Price is the ultimate equalizer in economics. When demand outstrips supply, prices surge.

Chart 2 compares the overall Consumer Price Index (CPI) with the daycare and preschool subcomponent. Childcare prices have risen much faster than overall inflation since 1991. One exception was during the height of the broad-based pandemic inflation from 2021-2022.

The childcare crisis is not new, but it has increased in intensity. Once parents returned to work and sought more childcare services, prices started to surge again. Since August 2024, prices for daycare and preschool have increased around two times the pace of overall inflation. That has contributed to the stickiness in service sector inflation.

The CPI is composed of a basket of goods and services for the typical urban consumer. Daycare and preschool comprise 0.7% of that basket, because mainly only parents with young children pay these costs. However, those parents often spend up to 20-30% of their income on childcare alone.12

In effect, they have been experiencing a much higher inflation rate than suggested by the headline CPI. That helps explain why the childcare crisis is increasingly affecting parents’ labor market decisions and outcomes, especially those who have young children.

Chart 2: CPI, all items vs. daycare & preschool (January 1991 - August 2025)

Index, dec 1990=100, SA

Source: KPMG Economics, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Haver

Work disruptions on the rise

As supply shortages and elevated demand have resulted in higher prices for childcare, more Americans are either working part-time or missing work entirely due to childcare problems. Our Parental Work Disruption Index found that an average of 1.34 million workers were affected by inadequate childcare options each month in 2024.13

More workers are impacted each year, especially since the pandemic. The index reached 120 in August, meaning there were 20% more workers affected compared to the pre-pandemic baseline. In 2024, 37 workers were affected by inadequate childcare options per 100 births (one year lagged). That is more than double the 18 from back in the 2007-2009 period.14

Again, those disruptions are worsening despite falling fertility rates. It shows that childcare problems are affecting more workers.

From 2000 to 2024, around 70% of those impacted were women aged 25-44, in their prime working years. That is additional evidence of the “motherhood penalty,” or “child penalty,” which is when women’s career opportunities and earnings do not recover after they have children.15

Men are not immune to childcare challenges. The share of workers impacted that were men grew to 11% in 2024 from 6% in 2000. Still, women comprise nearly nine-tenths of those affected.

The losses for the economy are large. The work disruptions resulted in up to 1.44 billion lost potential work hours in 2024.16 That translates to a large productivity loss for businesses. Workers lost between $15 billion and $44 billion in wages due to childcare problems, which can result in financial instability and lower consumption.

The Parental Work Disruption Index only evaluates the employed population. If the index declines due to workers leaving the labor force, that would be a false signal that Americans are facing fewer challenges with childcare. That is why it is essential to evaluate labor force participation rates.

Why do labor force participation rates matter?

The potential GDP of an economy equals the size of the labor force times productivity. The US is facing three headwinds to the size of the labor force: (1) aging population, (2) declining birth rates and (3) curbs on immigration. All else equal, a smaller labor force results in slower growth.

Boosting labor force participation rates can help offset these unfavorable trends. In the US, men’s prime-age rate, defined as those aged 25-54 years old, has recovered its post-pandemic drop but remains on a long-term downward trend. Research by the Federal Reserve found that the share of men not participating in the labor force due to caregiving has increased in each generation from the Silent, to the Baby Boomers, to Gen X to Millennials.17

Women’s prime-age participation rate has remained roughly flat over the past 30 years after surging in the 1970s and 1980s. Over the same period, the rates in other countries have grown substantially, including countries that previously lagged the US such as Japan and Spain.18

There are multiple reasons why the US is now the laggard among OECD countries. Parental leave expanded as firms competed for workers post-pandemic, but the US still lacks the paid leave and childcare benefits of its peers.19 There is a lack of part-time work options, especially compared to European countries.20

Other reasons include income taxation, job clustering by demographics and differences in healthcare, disability policies and work culture.21 Finally, the motherhood penalty plays a role.22

At the root, labor force participation rates reflect people’s ability to choose to work or not, in the arrangement that works best for them and their families. However, parents in the US face a more constrained choice than those in other countries due to the hurdles to accessing quality and affordable childcare.

The gap between those who can and those who want to work is still large. One survey found that nearly three-fifths of parents not working or working part-time would choose to work full-time if they had access to quality and affordable childcare.23

That means there are opportunities for employers to tap the talent base of these discouraged workers. On top of everything else, higher inflation in recent years has made working less of a choice and more of a necessity for everyone.

There are long-term consequences when parents are not able to provide for their children. Financial instability affects children’s development and mental health.24 Unstable childcare arrangements worsen these outcomes; reduced earning potential becomes generational and enacts large social and economic costs.25

Chart 3: Women with a BA or higher and young children have largest decline in labor force participation

Percentage points, difference from Dec 2023 to Aug 2025, 12 month moving average

Source: KPMG Economics, Sarah Flood et. al, IPUMS CPS

Mothers of young children are leaving the labor force

As some workers reduce their hours to part-time within the context of labor shortages and high childcare prices, others are increasingly leaving the labor force. Chart 3 shows the change in labor force participation rates by gender, educational attainment and age of youngest child from December 2023 to August 2025 on 12-month moving average bases.26

The two largest declines in labor force participation appeared among women with a BA or higher or with no BA whose youngest child is under five. The largest increases showed up among women with no BA and no children, men with no BA whose youngest child is between 5-18 and women with a BA or higher and no children.

Charts 4 and 5 display the labor force participation rates of prime-age women, by educational attainment, whose youngest child is under 5, the two groups with the largest declines in participation. Women in both groups left the labor force in the initial stages of the pandemic, but those without a BA were hit harder. Many of these workers were frontline workers.

Both groups increased participation from around 2021 to 2023, when fiscal stimulus helped employment recover in the sector. During this period, as the labor market tightened, many workers obtained new and better jobs while remote work reached its peak. The gains disproportionately flowed to those with more education. 

The decline in participation has been sharper for those with a BA or higher. Still, this group’s rate is well above its pre-pandemic benchmark. For those without a BA, the rate in August is below its pre-pandemic rate.

Looking at a longer time frame, the two groups have diverged since 2000. The rate has been on a general upward trend for those with a BA or higher (+9.7 ppts from December 2000 to August 2025 on a 12-month moving average basis). For those without a BA, it has been on a slight downward trend (-2.4 ppts over the same time period). This reflects the different labor market returns of education and the increasing bifurcation in the labor market.

Chart 4: Labor force participation rate of prime-age women with a BA or higher whose youngest child is under 5 (January 2000 - August 2025)

Percent

Source: KPMG Economics, Sarah Flood et. al, IPUMS CPS

Chart 5: Labor force participation rate of prime-age women with no BA whose youngest child is under 5 (January 2000 - August 2025)

Percent

Source: KPMG Economics, Sarah Flood et. al, IPUMS CPS

College-educated women without young children have increased participation

Zeroing in on those with more education, Chart 6 shows the participation rates of prime-age women who have a BA or higher, by the age of their youngest child. Since December 2023, college-educated women with no children or whose youngest child is between 5-18 years old have posted gains in participation. Both groups have begun to slip in recent months, but the upward trend is clear. Only the rate of those whose youngest child is under 5 has dropped.

Layoffs in white-collar industries like technology do not explain this disparity. Instead, specific features of the childcare crisis are disproportionately affecting women with young children, thereby influencing labor force participation rates.

First, these women are increasingly squeezed by high childcare costs, which they are more likely to pay out of pocket, in addition to daycare centers closing. Research has found that high childcare costs cause declines in labor force participation of mothers with young children.27

Second, return to office (RTO) mandates resulted in previously fully remote workers needing to work on a hybrid schedule.28 For parents with young children, shifting from zero days in the office to one, two or three days disrupts existing care arrangements.

Even if a hybrid schedule is more flexible than fully in-person, it still requires parents to create new childcare arrangements, especially as many workers now live farther away from workplaces.29 Facing these sudden shifts, one parent, disproportionately the mother, reduces work hours or leaves the labor force entirely.

Finally, unsupportive managers and workplace cultures are making it more difficult for some women to remain in the labor force. Given the higher demands of taking care of young children, this is not affecting women with older children or no children to the same degree.

Men whose youngest child is under 5, regardless of educational attainment, have increased their participation in the labor force over this same time period. This illustrates that the childcare crisis is continuing to disproportionately affect women and their labor market outcomes.

Chart 6: Labor force participation rate of prime-age women with a BA or higher by age of youngest child (December 2000 - August 2025)

Percent, 12 month moving average

Source: KPMG Economics, IPUMS CPS

Bottom Line

Labor shortages in childcare are colliding with elevated demand, resulting in higher prices. Women with young children in their prime working years are increasingly working part-time, missing work or leaving the labor force entirely. Those with a college degree are exiting the workforce the most.

Workers lose income, financial stability and career growth opportunities. Businesses lose productive and experienced workers and see a rise in employee burnout. The US economy as a whole grows more slowly.

Employers can gain an edge over competitors by understanding the stresses on the labor market caused by the childcare crisis and who is disproportionately impacted. Childcare is not an individual or personal issue; it is an economic and business imperative.

Footnote

  1. Gibbs, Hailey and MK Falgout. “The American Rescue Plan Shored Up Child Care, But a Long-Term Solution Is Necessary.” Center for American Progress. March 21, 2022.
  2. Bauer, Lauren and Sarah Yu Wang. “Prime-age women are going above and beyond in the labor market recovery.” Brookings. August 30, 2023 and Bauer, Lauren and Noadia Steinmetz-Silber. “Prime-age women are still driving the labor market recovery.” The Hamilton Project. July 26, 2024.
  3. Child Care Gaps Assessment.” Buffett Early Childhood Institute at the University of Nebraska. 2025.
  4. Federal Reserve System. “The Beige Book: Summary of Commentary on Current Economic Conditions by Federal Reserve District.” August 2025.
  5. For two examples, see Vermont (Merchen, Aaron and Aly Richards, “How Vermont’s Act 76 Revolutionizes Child Care Funding.” U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation. 2024.) and Georgia (Cutler, Eric. “Everything You Need to Know About Georgia’s Bill Tax Credits for Employers Providing Child Care (§ 48-7-40.6).” TOOTRiS. January 2024). New Mexico also recently became the first state to offer free, universal childcare.
  6. Grunewald, Rob, Ryan Nunn and Vanessa Palmer. “Examining teacher turnover in early care and education.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. April 29, 2022.
  7. Living Wage Institute. 2025.
  8. Coleman-Castillo, Karla and Veronica Faison. “Four Things You Should Know About How Immigration Impacts Care Work.” National Women’s Law Center. April 2025.
  9. Muñoz, Silvia and Caitlin McLean. “Immigration Policies Harm the Early Childhood Workforce and the Communities They Serve.” Center for the Study of Child Care Employment. April 22, 2025. 
  10. Plante, Jonathan. “The Childcare Industry: A Small Business Perspective.” Issue Brief 21. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy. September 12, 2024.
  11. CDC, National Center for Health Statistics. “U.S. Births Increase by 1% in 2024.” April 23, 2025.
  12. Reed, Sheri. “2025 Cost of Care Report: The true financial and emotional toll on families.” Care.com. January 29, 2025.
  13. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) definitions, that does not include those taking care of a sick child.
  14. Author’s unpublished calculations. Data for births from Our World in Data. United Nations. 2025.
  15. Goldin, Claudia, Sari Pekkala Kerr and Claudia Olivetti. “When the Kids Grow Up: Women’s Employment and Earnings across the Family Cycle.” NBER Working Paper No. 30323. National Bureau of Economic Research. August 2022 and Kleven, Henrik, Camille Landais and Gabriel Leite-Mariante. “The Child Penalty Atlas.” NBER Working Paper No. 31649. National Bureau of Economic Research. August 2023.
  16. Author’s calculations using the same methodology in Nestler, Matthew. “The parental work disruption index: A new measure of the childcare crisis.” KPMG US. September 30, 2024.
  17. Bengali, Leila, Mary C. Daly, Evgeniya A. Duzhak and Cindy Zhao. “Pulled Out or Pushed Out? Declining Male Labor Force Participation.” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2025-07. April 2025.
  18. OECD Data Explorer. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2024.
  19. Olivetti, Claudia and Barbara Petrongolo. “The Economic Consequences of Family Policies: Lessons from a Century of Legislation in High-Income Countries.” Journal of Economic Perspectives. 31 (1). Winter 2017; Albanesi, Stefania, Claudia Olivetti and Barbara Petrongolo. “Families, Labor Markets, and Policy.” NBER Working Paper No. 30685. National Bureau of Economic Research. November 2022; and Lim, Nayeon and Lisa-Marie Duletzki. “The Effects of Public Childcare Expansion on Child Penalties – Evidence From West Germany.” IED Working Papers, Boston University Institute for Economic Development. July 14, 2023.
  20. Barbieri, Paolo, Giorgio Cutuli, Rafaelle Guetto and Stefani Scherer. “Part-time employment as a way to increase women’s employment: (Where) does it work?” International Journal of Comparative Sociology. 60 (4). Juny 6, 2019.
  21. Tedeschi, Ernie. “Why has the US fallen behind the UK in labor force participation?” Medium. February 23, 2018 and Albanesi, Stefania. “The Outlook for Women’s Employment and Labor Force Participation.” NBER Working Paper No. w31916. National Bureau of Economic Research. December 5, 2023.
  22. Kleven, Henrik. “Child Penalties and Gender Inequality.” The Reporter. National Bureau of Economic Research. December 31, 2022.
  23. First Five Years Fund. “The First Five Things To Know About: A New Poll Showing Voter Support for Child Care Funding.” July 16, 2023.
  24. Sandstrom, Heather and Sandra Huerta. “The Negative Effects of Instability on Child Development: A Research Synthesis.” Low-Income Working Families Discussion Paper 3. Urban Institute. September 2013 and American Psychological Association. “Mental health effects of poverty, hunger, and homelessness on children and teens.” May 2024.
  25. Ros Pilarz, Alejandra and Heather D. Hill. “Unstable and Multiple Child Care Arrangements and Young Children’s Behavior.” Early Childhood Research Quarterly. 29 (4). 2014 and Hamad, Rita, Fenaba Addo and Kimberly Montez. “Reducing Intergenerational Poverty—An Essential Driver of Health.” JAMA Pediatrics. 178 (4). February 2024.
  26. This analysis uses microdata from the Current Population Survey (CPS), accessed from IPUMS. See Flood, Sarah, Miriam King, Renae Rodgers, Steven Ruggles, J. Robert Warren, Daniel Backman, Annie Chen, Grace Cooper, Stephanie Richards, Megan Schouweiler, and Michael Westberry. IPUMS CPS: Version 12.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 2024. https://doi.org/10.18128/D030.V12.0.
  27. Araujo, Valeska, Linden McBride and Danielle H. Sandler. “The Impact of Childcare Costs on Mothers’ Labor Force Participation.” Center for Economic Studies. U.S. Census Bureau. April 2025.
  28. Borkowski, Connor and Rifat Kaynas. “Telework trends.” Beyond the Numbers: Employment & Unemployment. 14 (2). U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. March 2025.
  29. Akan, Mert et. al. “Americans Now Live Farther From Their Employers.” Gusto. March 3, 2024.

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