Latest CJEU, EFTA and ECHR

      CJEU

      AG opinion on the compatibility of the Belgian excess profit ruling scheme with EU State Aid rules

      On April 29, 2026, Advocate General (AG) Juliane Kokott of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered an opinion on a series of appeals concerning the Belgian ‘excess profit’ tax ruling practice1. The cases addressed whether the practice, which has been classified by the CJEU as a ‘scheme’, is compatible with EU State aid rules.

      Belgian tax legislation provided for the possibility for a Belgian company that is a member of a multinational group to make unilateral downward adjustments to its taxable base for “excess profits”. A ruling had to be requested prior to making such a downward adjustment2. In February 2015, the European Commission (the Commission or the EC) launched an investigation into alleged State aid granted by way of this ruling practice. On January 11, 2016, the Commission concluded that the excess profit tax ruling system was a tax scheme which constituted State aid. The Commission also noted that Belgium is required to recover the aid granted from the beneficiaries of the tax rulings.

      Several beneficiaries of the disputed system appealed the Commission’s decision. The General Court of the CJEU joined cases T-131/16, brought by the Belgian State, and T-263/16, brought by one of the beneficiaries of the excess profit rulings. On February 14, 2019, the General Court of the CJEU annulled the Commission’s decision in its entirety, holding that the Commission had failed to establish the existence of a ‘scheme’ – i.e., the Commission was not allowed to challenge the tax rulings in question “as a package”. The EC subsequently appealed that judgment to the CJEU and, in parallel, opened 39 separate in-depth investigations to assess whether the individual ‘excess profit rulings’ granted by Belgium between 2005 and 2014 breached EU State aid rules.

      On September 16, 2021, the CJEU held that the Commission had been correct in classifying the Belgian tax rulings practice as a ‘scheme’ and therefore set aside the General Court’s judgment. However, the CJEU did not rule on the compatibility of the scheme with EU law. Instead, it held that, given the state of the proceedings, it was for the General Court to determine whether the excess profit rulings constituted unlawful State aid and, if so, whether recovery of the aid infringed the principles of legality and protection of legitimate expectations. The case was therefore referred back to the General Court.

      On September 20, 2023, the General Court ruled that the Commission had correctly concluded that the Belgian tax rulings constituted unlawful State aid. The General Court also dismissed 29 separate appeals brought by the beneficiaries of the excess profit rulings against the EC’s State aid decision – see Euro Tax Flash Issue 523. Following that judgment, several beneficiaries appealed the General Court’s decision before the CJEU.

      AG Kokott started the analysis by stating that the key issue of the case was the extent to which the EC and EU Courts must defer to a Member State’s interpretation of its domestic tax law when identifying the ‘reference framework’3 for assessing selectivity under State aid rules, particularly where that interpretation is inconsistent with the wording of the law.

      The AG then addressed the first ground of appeal, in which the plaintiffs claimed that the General Court had failed to take into account the established Belgian administrative practice for interpreting Article 185(2)(b) of the Belgian Income Tax Code and had instead relied on its own interpretation of the Belgian law. In this regard, the AG recalled the CJEU’s settled case-law based on which, when determining the reference framework, the Commission and the EU Courts are, in principle, bound by the Member State’s own configuration and interpretation of its national tax law. The AG recalled that, however, such discretion is exceeded where the tax law is designed in an inconsistent manner or where national rules are manifestly applied in an inconsistent or unlawful manner. The AG then cited the Court’s case-law based on which the judicial standard of review to be applied is limited to a mere plausibility check.

      Applying this standard, the AG found that the General Court had correctly upheld the reference framework identified by the EC, and that the derogation from that framework lay not in Article 185(2)(b) itself, but in its manifestly unlawful application. In the AG’s view, Article 185(2)(b) was intended to codify the arm’s length principle in the context of specific cross‑border transactions between associated enterprises. The AG noted that, however, the Belgian authorities applied this provision without requiring any identifiable cross‑border transaction and instead authorized a general downward adjustment of overall profits to a hypothetical benchmark. This approach, according to the AG, amounted to an interpretation contrary to both the wording and the purpose of Article 185(2)(b) and therefore could not be regarded as part of the relevant reference framework.

      The AG further rejected the plea that multinational companies were not in a comparable situation to stand-alone entities. Whilst acknowledging that cross-border groups may face risks such as double taxation, the AG noted that the Belgian scheme did not actually address such risks, as it was not contingent on the existence of cross-borders dealings. In the AG’s view, by allowing only multinational group entities to benefit from reduced taxation on a portion of their profits, the regime resulted in unequal treatment of companies in comparable legal and factual situations. Consequently, the AG found that the measure conferred a selective advantage.

      Regarding the recovery of the aid, the AG concluded that beneficiaries could not rely on the principle of legitimate expectations, given that the tax rulings were based on an interpretation that was manifestly inconsistent with the law. Therefore, in the AG’s view, the recovery of the unlawful aid was justified. However, in specific cases involving certain corporate groups, the AG suggested that recovery should be limited to the entities that directly benefited from the scheme, rather than extending to the broader group.

      In light of these considerations, the AG proposed that the CJEU dismiss the appeals and confirm that the Belgian excess profit ruling practice constitutes unlawful State aid under EU law.

      Infringements procedures and CJEU referrals

      Infringement procedures

      Hungary referred to the CJEU over retail tax regime

      On April 29, 2026, the European Commission announced its decision to refer Hungary to the CJEU for failing to abolish its retail tax regime.

      Retailers operating in Hungary are subject to a retail tax on gross revenues derived from retail sales. When calculating the tax base, the turnover of associated companies must be added up. The applicable tax rates are steeply progressive.

      In practice, foreign-controlled retail companies operating in Hungary are often subject to the highest progressive tax rates due to their business model, i.e., integrated retail chains. In the case of such groups, the turnover of associated companies is aggregated for tax purposes. In contrast, domestic retailers of similar size typically operate under a franchise model, which does not trigger the aggregation requirement. Domestic retailers are therefore not subject to the highest tax rates. The EC is of the view that this tax regime negatively affects foreign retailers. Moreover, even if foreign-controlled retailers were to restructure their integrated models into separate companies, these entities would still be considered associated and would therefore be subject to the aggregation requirement. The Commission is of the view that this difference in treatment represents a restriction on the freedom of establishment.

      Hungary had been previously informed, through the 2023 and 2024 Country-Specific Recommendations, that the retail tax disproportionately burdens foreign multinationals. As part of its Recovery and Resilience Plan, Hungary committed to phasing out the retail tax regime. However, Hungary has continued to extend the regime and has progressively increased the highest tax rates. The Commission had already sent to Hungary a letter of formal notice in October 2024, followed by a reasoned opinion in October 2025 – see E-News Issue 214.

      For more details, please refer to the Commission’s April 2026 infringement package.

      CJEU referrals

      CJEU referral on whether Italian mandatory fixed tax penalties comply with the EU principle of proportionality

      On April 27, 2026, a referral made by the Corte di Giustizia Tributaria di secondo grado del Lazio (the Court) to the CJEU was published in the Official Journal of the EU (case C-67/26). The case concerns the compatibility of the Italian tax penalty regime with Article 49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of EU (the Charter).

      Under Italian law, a fixed administrative penalty ranging from 25 percent to 50 percent of the amount of expenses or other negative components deducted in relation to goods or services that were not actually exchanged or supplied but were nevertheless reported in the tax return. The legislation does not allow national courts to reduce or eliminate the penalty, even in exceptional circumstances where the sanction may appear manifestly disproportionate to the infringement committed or the damage caused.

      Against this background, the referring court asked the CJEU whether Article 49(3) of the Charter, read in light of the principle of proportionality, precludes such national legislation where the penalty is fixed and courts have no discretion to mitigate it.

      CJEU referral on the compatibility of FATCA with GDPR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

      On April 27, 2026, the Brussels Court of Appeal made a reference to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling regarding the compatibility of any international agreement concluded by a Member State before May 24, 2016 involving the exchange of personal data with a third country, such as those relating to the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR).

      The case involved a Belgian resident with United States citizenship who challenged Belgium’s automatic exchange of information with the US under the bilateral agreement signed on April 23, 2014. The central issue is whether this framework allowing for the sharing of personal tax data complies with EU data protection law, as well as the fundamental rights protected by EU law.

      The referring court has asked the CJEU to rule on several questions, primarily on whether:

      • Large-scale data sharing, carried out without prior risk-based selection, without clear limits on data retention, and covering extensive personal and financial information (such as names, addresses, tax identification numbers, and account details), complies with the EU’s data protection framework and fundamental rights, including the right to privacy and data protection.
      • With respect to the derogations permitted under the EU’s data protection framework with respect to transfers of personal data necessary or legally required on important public interest grounds, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims, whether the exception can be justified when the third country does not guarantee effective reciprocity.
      • Article 96 of the GDPR can still be relied upon by Member States in 2025 to justify applying an older international treaty that is not compliant with the GDPR, particularly where it has not made sufficient efforts to amend, replace, or revoke that treaty. It essentially asks whether the protection for pre-2016 agreements continue to apply in circumstances where the Member State has not acted to ensure compliance with EU data protection rules.

      EU institutions

      European Commission

      Middle East Crisis Temporary State Aid Framework published

      On April 29, 2026, the European Commission announced the adoption of the Middle East Crisis Temporary State Aid Framework (METSAF). METSAF is a temporary and targeted State aid regime applicable until December 31, 2026, aimed at mitigating the impact of the Middle East crisis on undertakings active in

      • the agriculture, fishery and land transport (rail, road and inland waterways transport) sector,
      • intra-EU short sea shipping services, and
      • energy-intensive industries.

      Under METSAF, Member States may grant aid as follows:

      • For agriculture, fishery, land transport and intra-EU short sea shipping, Member States will be able to compensate up to 70 percent of a beneficiary's extra costs due to the price increase of fuel and fertilizer caused by the crisis. This is calculated by reference to the difference between current market prices and a historical benchmark, applied to the beneficiary’s current or pre‑crisis fuel consumption.
      • As an alternative, Member States may apply a simplified aid mechanism, allowing support of up to EUR 50,000 per beneficiary on the basis of a general estimate of fuel consumption in the sector (using different sectoral proxies), without requiring detailed evidence of actual fuel consumption.
      • For energy-intensive industries eligible under temporary electricity price relief schemes in line with section 4.5 of the Clean Industrial Deal State aid Framework (CISAF), it will be possible to increase the aid intensity from 50 percent to up to 70 percent for the electricity cost of the eligible consumption.

      It is noted that the aid under the METSAF can be granted, amongst others, in the form of tax advantages. The tax liability for which a tax advantage is granted must have arisen no later than December 31, 2026, or in respect of tax periods ending before or on December 31, 2026.

      National aid schemes must be notified to the European Commission, but benefit from an accelerated approval process.

      For more information, please refer to the Commission’s release. For more information on the CISAF, please refer to Euro Tax Flash Issue 572.

      Commission Delegated Regulation on the calculation of the market capitalization ratio under the FASTER Directive published in the Official Journal

      On April 21, 2026, the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/110 (the Regulation) was published in the Official Journal of the EU. The Regulation supplements the Directive on Faster and Safer Relief of Excess Withholding Taxes (FASTER) – see Euro Tax Flash Issue 541 and it sets out a methodology for calculating:

      • the market capitalization of an EU Member State; and
      • the market capitalization ratio of an EU Member State.

      The FASTER Directive introduces the following key measures: i) digital tax residence certificates (eTRC); ii) fast-track withholding tax relief procedures, and iii) additional registration, reporting and due diligence requirements for financial intermediaries. The market capitalization ratio of a Member State is one of the criteria allowing Member States to maintain their existing relief-at-source system, instead of applying the procedures set out in Chapter III of the FASTER Directive. Particularly, Member States classified as having a low market capitalization – i.e., below 1.5 percent for at least four consecutive years and which have a comprehensive relief at source system with regards to dividends from publicly traded shares, are exempt from the obligations of Chapter III. 

      Member States are required to transpose the FASTER Directive by December 31, 2028. The rules will become applicable as of January 1, 2030.

      OECD and other International Organizations

      OECD

      New OECD releases on Global Minimum Tax

      On April 30, 2026, the OECD released the Global Minimum Tax (GMT) Implementation Toolkit and the GMT Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ).

      The Toolkit is primarily aimed at tax administrations implementing GMT but may help businesses in two ways:

      • illustrating the variation and divergence in local rule interpretation and application of the GMT, a key focus area ahead of the June 2026 filing deadlines;
      • calling for grace periods for return correction, penalty relief and return-filing extensions where merited; though it remains to be seen whether administrations follow through on this.

      The FAQ document is a refresh of an earlier FAQ document and includes 27 questions divided across five sections. Two sections deal with the basic GMT charging and calculation rules (and largely replicate the content from the earlier FAQ document), with the remaining three sections dealing with the Side-by-Side Package. 

      For more information, please refer to a report prepared by KPMG International.

      Practical guide to investment tax incentives published

      On April 27, 2026, the OECD released a practical guide to investment tax incentives, which is aimed at supporting policymakers, particularly in developing economies with respect to the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of investment tax incentives.

      From a design and administration perspective, key recommendations include:

      • The guide recommends that policymakers focus on incentives that provide preferential tax treatment based on firm expenditure over those that give relief based on income. In particular, this includes expenditure-based incentives (including accelerated depreciation, tax allowances and credits) that provide tax relief in relation to capital investment (e.g. machinery) or current expenses (e.g. for training, R&D activities).
      • According to the guide, a tax incentive should be closely targeted to its goal, ensuring tax relief is only available for projects that directly support the stated objective (e.g., job creation, training and education, energy efficiency, export promotion), and which would not have materialized without the incentive. In addition, the guide recommends offering tax incentives based on clear, specific and measurable criteria to increase certainty, limit discretion and enable review and evaluations. Furthermore, the guide weighs the benefits and disadvantages of temporary limitations, caps and ceilings, refundability and transferability of tax credits as well as sunset clauses in the context of certainty, complexity, administrability and long-term fiscal costs.
      • The guide recommends ensuring that processes for receiving incentives are transparent and predictable to reduce compliance costs and uncertainty for investors, and administrative costs for governments. In particular, policymakers are encouraged to prioritize self-assessment of eligibility by taxpayers and reduce opportunities for excessive discretion by authorities in selecting beneficiaries. At the same time, the guide recommends the introduction of targeted verification and risk-based enforcement measures with requirements for taxpayers to meet basic compliance and filing obligations.

      For more information on how the application of different types of tax incentives may trigger a potential Pillar Two exposure and how countries may be incentivized to adjust their tax system to ensure tax incentives remain effective and efficient following the implementation of Pillar Two, please refer to a dedicated KPMG article.

      Local Law and Regulations

      France

      Revised list of non-cooperative jurisdictions issued

      On April 15, 2026, the French tax authorities published a revised list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, adding Vietnam and removing Fiji, Samoa and Trinidad and Tobago.

      The French list generally follows the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdiction adopted by the Economic and Financial Affairs Council on February 17, 2026 (please see E-News Issue 226), but applies additional local tax good governance criteria.

      As a result, Antigua and Barbuda remained on the French list, even though it has been removed from the EU list.

      Following the April update, the French list includes the following eleven jurisdictions and territories: American Samoa, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Guam, Palau, Panama, the Russian Federation, Turks and Caicos Islands, the US Virgin Islands, Vanuatu, Vietnam.

      Note that France applies different defensive measures depending on the criteria based on which a country is listed. For details on defensive measures adopted by EU Member States against non-cooperative jurisdictions, please refer to KPMG’s summary of proposed or enacted measures.

      For previous coverage, please refer to E-News Issue 212.

      Netherlands

      Pillar Two tax return forms published

      On April 23, 2026, the Dutch tax administration made available the forms to be used to comply with the three main obligations under the Pillar Two Minimum Tax Act in the Netherlands.

      • GloBE Information Return (GIR): The GIR xml schema has been made available and aligns with the GIR materials published by the OECD in January 2025. The GIR must be submitted by all Dutch Constituent Entities or a Dutch Designated Filing Entity (on behalf of all Dutch entities), unless it is filed in another jurisdiction and exchanged with the Netherlands (under DAC9 or the GIR MCAA). The GIR can be submitted via the portal “Digipoort” from June 1, 2026, and will be automatically exchanged with qualifying countries. The deadline for GIR filing is 15 months after the end of the fiscal year (18 months for the transitional year). Accordingly, calendar-year taxpayers will have their first filing obligation by June 30, 2026, in respect of the 2024 fiscal year.
      • GIR notification: If the GIR is filed in another jurisdiction, a notification must be submitted to the Dutch tax authorities via an online form on the tax administration’s portal “Belastingdienst Gegevensportalen” (available from June 2, 2026). Such notification is to be made within the same deadline as for the GIR.
      • Local Tax Return for Pillar Two taxes: A single local tax return for IIR, UTPR and QDMTT has also been made available. The form can be submitted via the portal “Mijn Belastingdienst Zakelijk” from June 1, 2026. The form is relatively short and does not require the disclosure of detailed IIR, UTPR, or QDMTT calculations. Instead, only general information (e.g., identification of group, UPE, GIR-filing entity, contact person) and a declaration of the amount of top-up tax payable is required. The deadline for both tax return and settlement of top-up tax liability is 17 months after the end of the reporting fiscal year (20 months for the transitional year). Accordingly, calendar-year taxpayers will have their first filing obligations by August 31, 2026, in respect of the 2024 fiscal year. For QDMTT and UTPR, there is a possibility to elect a Dutch designated entity to file and pay the tax on behalf of all Dutch Constituent Entities. No tax return will need to be filed in cases where no top-up tax is payable in the Netherlands.

      For more information on Dutch Pillar Two compliance requirements, please refer to the KPMG BEPS 2.0 tracker in Digital Gateway.

      Switzerland

      Extension of tax losses carried forward period from seven to ten years

      On April 17, 2026, the 100‑day referendum period relating to the Federal Act on the extension of loss carry‑forward expired without being exercised. The Act had been adopted by Parliament on December 19, 2025, and published in the Federal Gazette on January 7, 2026, and extends the tax loss carryforward period from seven to ten years.

      The extended ten‑year loss carryforward period applies to losses incurred from the 2020 tax period onwards. Losses incurred in tax periods prior to 2020 remain subject to the existing seven‑year carryforward limitation.

      The measure applies to direct federal tax as well as cantonal and communal taxes and applies to both self-employed individuals and legal entities. Finally, it also covers losses incurred by foreign permanent establishments of Swiss companies.

      The Federal Council is expected to formally confirm the entry into force as of January 1, 2028.

      Local courts

      Belgium

      Mons Court of Appeal confirms denial of PSD benefits based on the anti-abuse rule of the Directive

      On January 21, 2026, the Mons Court of Appeal in Belgium (the Court) issued a decision in a case (2024/RG/227) concerning the applicability of the anti-abuse provision in the Belgian implementation of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (PSD).

      The case concerns a series of transactions aimed at restructuring the holding structure of a family-owned business. In December 2016, a Belgian individual contributed their shares in the family’s holding company (OldHoldCo) to a newly incorporated company (NewHoldCo). Shortly thereafter, OldHoldCo received a large amount of dividends from its operating subsidiary, which was then almost entirely redistributed to NewHoldCo. The latter used these funds to acquire shares from the individual’s siblings, thereby facilitating their exit from the family structure. Both OldHoldCo and NewHoldCo applied the dividend received deduction regime (DRD) for the amounts received4.

      Following a tax audit, the Belgian tax authorities took the view that NewHoldCo functioned as a passive conduit entity established to convert taxable profit distributions into tax-exempt liquidity used to finance a share buyback. The tax authorities based their conclusion on several factors, including the speed of the transactions – completed within 10 days, the absence of activity for more than four years, the lack of employees and own premises, and the close correspondence between the amount of exempt dividends received (EUR 22.20 million) and the share buyback price (EUR 21 million). Consequently, the tax authorities denied the dividend received deduction at the level of NewHoldCo. The taxpayers challenged the reassessment, and the dispute was ultimately brought before the Mons Court of Appeal.

      The Court upheld the position of the tax authorities and held that the case involved tax abuse, based on the following grounds:

      • Subjective element (intent): in the Court’s view the main purpose of the structure was to obtain a tax benefit – i.e., the DRD, which was contrary to the objective of the PSD.
      • Objective element (circumventing the purpose of the law): the Court held that this condition was met on the basis that NewHoldCo lacked economic substance, as it had no business activity, no employees, no premises, and generated only limited revenue during the four years following its incorporation in 2016.

      The Court of Appeal also rejected the taxpayers’ plea that the structure was driven by non-tax considerations, namely family restructuring and succession planning. In this context, the Court found that these reasons were not sufficiently substantiated and could have been achieved through the existing holding company, OldHoldCo. In addition, the Court rejected the relevance of NewHoldCo’s subsequent activities from 2022 onwards, holding that they had no impact on the assessment of the transactions carried out in 2016.

      South Africa

      South African Constitutional Court confirms that taxpayers cannot rely on ignorance of downstream steps in avoidance schemes

      On April 22, 2026, the South African Constitutional issued a ruling in a case concerning the applicability of the domestic general anti‑avoidance rule (GAAR).

      The plaintiff, a South African bank, participated in a preference share funding arrangement implemented between 2011 and 2015. Under this structure, funds were routed through a chain of entities and financial instruments, ultimately converting what would ordinarily have been taxable interest income into tax‑exempt dividend income received by the bank on its preference shares. During a tax audit, the South African tax authorities (SARS) challenged the arrangement under the local GAAR. The bank pleaded that it was unaware of the downstream entities and steps, and that it merely received dividends that were lawfully exempt from tax. Nevertheless, the authorities recharacterized the dividend income as normal taxable income, on the basis that the structure constituted an ‘impermissible avoidance arrangement’ designed to secure a tax benefit.

      The taxpayer initially challenged the assessment issued by SARS, and the High Court set it aside. However, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned the High Court’s decision and upheld SARS’s position. The taxpayer subsequently appealed to the Constitutional Court.

      The Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the GAAR does not require the assessed taxpayer to have directly avoided tax in its own hands; it is sufficient that the arrangement, viewed as a whole, produced a tax benefit that ultimately accrued to that taxpayer, in this case in the form of the tax‑free dividends.

      The Constitutional Court found that the arrangement lacked any bona fide commercial purpose beyond tax avoidance and that its main purpose was to exploit the tax‑exempt nature of certain payments. The Constitutional Court also held that a taxpayer cannot isolate and “compartmentalize” its purportedly innocent participation in a single step of a wider scheme in order to avoid being treated as a party to the overall arrangement. In the Constitutional Court’s view, by knowingly investing into secure tax‑free returns, the taxpayer took a critical, pre‑planned step in a structure that yielded a tax‑avoidance outcome. The Constitutional Court also held that the South African GAAR requires a substance‑over‑form enquiry, and the use of intermediaries, complex structuring or offshore elements does not shield ultimate beneficiaries from its operation. The Constitutional Court rejected the plaintiff’s plea that the GAAR demands a direct, one‑to‑one correspondence between the tax avoided and the taxpayer assessed, and confirmed that the SARS were entitled to recharacterize the dividend income as interest and tax it accordingly. In the Constitutional Court view, allowing taxpayers to retain the economic benefit of a scheme merely because another entity is the one that technically avoided the tax would undermine the purpose of GAAR. 

      KPMG Insights

      KPMG European Financial Services Tax perspectives webcast – replay now available

      With Europe’s tax landscape evolving at speed, asset managers, banks and insurers are facing a level of change and scrutiny that is reshaping how they operate across the region.

      On April 29, 2026, a panel of KPMG tax specialists shared their insights on the tax initiatives poised to have the greatest impact on financial services, including a closer look at:

      • Tax Simplification Initiative – what the European Commission’s plans for simplification in Tax could mean for financial services institutions and what to prepare for.
      • Bank Taxes in Europe – survey of the plethora of new, and not so new, specific taxes that can impact banks (and also their customers).
      • Non-Harmonized Directives Across the EU – navigating the practical risks created for FS organizations by fragmented approaches across Member States.

      The webcast playback and presentation materials are now available. Please click on the event page to access them. 


      Key links

      • Visit our website for earlier editions.

      Raluca Enache

      Head of KPMG’s EU Tax Centre

      KPMG in Romania


      Ana Puscas

      Associate Director, KPMG's EU Tax Centre

      KPMG in Romania


      Marco Dietrich

      Senior Manager, KPMG's EU Tax Centre

      KPMG in Germany


      maud-gendebien
      Maud Gendebien

      Senior Manager, KPMG’s EU Tax Centre

      KPMG in Mauritius


      Damian Cassar
      Damian Cassar

      Consultant, KPMG’s EU Tax Centre

      KPMG in Malta


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      1 The link refers to the AG’s opinion in the joined cases C‑734/23 P and C‑735/23 P. On the same date, AG Kokott also delivered similar opinions in cases C-736/23 P, C-737/23 P to C-742/23 P, C-752/23 P, C-754/23 P, C-755/23 P, C-756/23 P, and joined cases C-757/23 P and C-758/23 P.

      2 The practice was based on Article 185(2)(b) of the Belgian Income Tax Code 1992, which allows an adjustment of corporate profits where those profits have been influenced by arrangements that do not comply with the arm’s length principle.

      3 It is settled CJEU case-law that the analysis of whether a national measure constitutes unlawful State aid requires several steps, including for the EC to demonstrate that the measure conferred a selective advantage on the beneficiary. For this purpose, the Commission is tasked with (i) identifying the reference system, i.e. the ordinary tax system applicable in that Member State in a factually comparable situation (by reference to the objectives of that regime), and (ii) demonstrating that the disputed tax measure – in this case the tax rulings – is a derogation from that ‘normal’ system.

      4 Under the Belgian rules implementing the PSD applicable at that time, dividends that were eligible for the tax benefits prescribed by the PSD were initially included in the tax base of the recipient company, followed by a 100 percent deduction – the so-called dividend received deduction regime (DRD).


      Alt

      E-News 229 - May 11, 2026

      KPMG’s EU Tax Centre compiles a regular update of EU and international tax developments that can have both a domestic and a cross-border impact, with the aim of helping you keep track of and understand these developments and how they can impact your business.

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      Partner
      KPMG in Malta
      E: johnellulsullivan@kpmg.com.mt

      António Coelho
      Partner
      KPMG in Portugal
      E: antoniocoelho@kpmg.com

      Julio Cesar García
      Partner
      KPMG in Spain
      E: juliocesargarcia@kpmg.es

      Matthew Herrington
      Partner
      KPMG in the UK
      E: Matthew.Herrington@kpmg.co.uk