Accurate delineation of the transaction and the benefit test
The OECD made clear its intention is not to change the ‘benefit test’, i.e. the threshold for recognition that a service has been provided, but to provide more clarity as well as consistency with Chapter I, which was extensively revised during the original BEPS project. One important clarification is that the test is quite separate from the question of the value of the service – important because some tax authorities argue on audit that if the service could be obtained cheaper locally, then no ‘benefit’ has been provided.
Shareholder activities and incidental benefits
Commentators highlighted the risk that lists of examples, such as those of shareholder activities, are treated as both prescriptive and exclusive on audit. This was a risk also referred to in relation to some of the other topics, and the OECD was encouraged to emphasise that they are no more than examples of a principle. Participants also insisted on the need for guidance on how to apportion the cost base of activities that can both provide a benefit to subsidiaries and fulfil a shareholder requirement. Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) activities were raised in many of the written submissions and encompass some types of activity that meet the benefit test and others that are pure shareholder functions, while others may be mixed. More work on this area will be needed to achieve the goals of clarity and practicality.
Provision of services in connection with other transactions (focus on delineating intangible transactions versus services)
This prompted the most debate between commentators and delegates. Broadly, the concern the OECD tried to address in the guidance and examples was the perception that services would always result in a lower, cost-based value compared to transfers of intangibles, and that this could even be exploited. Delegates suggested the pricing outcome would be similar for a similar fact pattern whether or not it was ‘characterised’ in one way or another. Commentators were highly concerned that no distinction seemed to be made between a service that was delivered using, for example, know-how and a transaction that was intended actually to transfer that know-how and the rights to exploit it. Comparisons were drawn with Chapter VI of the Guidelines as well as the Commentary on Article 12 of the Model Treaty and withholding tax tests. There was a particular focus on paragraph 7.41 and Example 16, and acknowledgment there may need to be revisions to the drafting here.
Charging approaches and allocation keys
Alongside some familiar discussion of the pros and cons of direct vs indirect allocations, this was another area where commentators highlighted tax authority behaviour issues. Specifically, there was a plea for valid allocation keys not to be set aside on audit in favour of other keys simply because they are also available – rather, the tax authority should be obliged to demonstrate first that the taxpayer’s allocation was inappropriate. Similarly, where an indirect method has been used appropriately, taxpayers should not be challenged to somehow prove the link between the provider, the recipient, the amount charged and the service received since it is the difficulty / near impossibility of achieving this that led to the decision to apply the indirect method. The challenge for OECD delegates, however, was how to draft the Guidelines in such a way that individual countries could not misuse them in this way.
Transfer pricing methodologies including cost base and pass-through costs
Taxpayers were concerned here, among other matters, with the increased emphasis in the draft on the use of profit-splits for services, as well as the practicalities of identifying pass-through costs. Again, there seemed a degree of separation between what OECD delegates thought had been illustrated and what commentators thought was being asked for – or at least what they thought tax authorities would seize on. The OECD was concerned only to establish that a profit-split should not be ruled out as a possible method for services, and that where a taxpayer knows whether third party suppliers pass through certain costs with no mark-up it should apply that knowledge in its intra-group arrangements (as opposed to an implied obligation for the taxpayer to investigate what industry practices may exist).
Documentation and other issues
Here there were primarily two pleas: that additional detailed documentation burdens should not be imposed, and that a deficiency should not lead to a disallowance under domestic law from tax authorities who use this as a way to impose adjustments without allowing recourse to the mutual agreement procedure (MAP) to relieve the double taxation. The use of domestic law in this way was also raised in connection with many of the other issues relating to services, including allocation methods and the benefit test. ‘Documentation’ in this context refers mainly to evidence in support of transactions – there was no suggestion that transfer pricing reports such as the Master File and Local File should be supplemented with an additional report dedicated to services, but there was a real concern from commentators about the level of detailed evidence that might be needed to prove a service had been provided, whether from operating systems, ‘IT tickets’, or tangible outputs such as reports and meeting minutes. The OECD was similarly clear that tax authorities require strong evidence of the provision of services but were mindful of the need to balance this with proportionality and clarity.