National and Regional Risk Visibility. As it stands, the system struggles to unify and collate national and regional views of cyber risk. Local health and care providers are responsible for cyber risk management and adopting tailored methodologies for their environment, but many are without the workforce or capability to do so effectively.
Supply Chain Resilience. Limited visibility and inconsistent risk management approaches are adopted by health and care providers, when understanding, managing, and assuring the security risks that arise from dependencies on external suppliers and resultant supply chains partners.
Workforce and Skills. A lack of sufficiently skilled cyber security professionals, both in the health and care system and wider UK market, makes it challenging for healthcare providers to attract and retain expertise required to support leaders in improving their organisational cyber security resilience.
Emerging/New Technologies. The pace of new digital, data and technology product adoption (e.g. AI and connected medical devices) has increased among health and care providers, presenting an ever increasing challenge to assure the cyber security resilience of new products against emerging international standards. Without assurance, every new technology can present a new risk to an organisation and the wider healthcare system’s ‘defend as one’ ambition.
Outdated/Legacy Technologies. The health and care system (at all levels) has a continued reliance on outdated and unsupported technologies, increasing the challenge to monitor and replace older technologies that are more vulnerable to cyber-attacks.
Governance & Regulation. Accountabilities for cyber risk are unclear within this decentralised, complex sector, which has led to uncertainties among health and care leaders on how to govern and assign appropriate resources to dedicate to their organisation’s cyber security resilience.