1. What is the Side-by-Side System?
In simple terms the SbSS prevents an IIR or UTPR from applying to a multinational enterprise (MNE) group that has its UPE in the US.
The SbSS is likely to be of most relevance to US-headquartered groups that have operations in low-tax jurisdictions that have not implemented a Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax (QDMTT) or domestic minimum top-up tax (DMT). As these jurisdictions would effectively be exposed to top-up tax under an IIR or UTPR without the application of the SbSS.
2. Will the Side-by-Side System apply to groups headquartered in any other jurisdictions?
The SbSS requires several domestic and international tax conditions to be met and whether a jurisdiction qualifies under the SbSS is ultimately subject to the purview of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS (IF).
It is currently unclear whether any other jurisdictions could benefit from the SbSS and beneficiaries of the SbSS are expected to be limited. Hong Kong SAR (Hong Kong) and Singapore will not benefit from the SbSS. Initially, it would appear that the Chinese Mainland does not meet the required conditions either.
3. Will the Side-by-Side System apply retroactively to 2024 and 2025?
The SbSS is expected to apply in respect of financial years beginning on or after 1 January 2026. This means that the SbSS is fundamentally prospective in nature. In other words, US-headquartered groups would continue to be exposed to applicable IIRs and UTPRs for 2024 and 2025.
4. How will jurisdictions implement the Side-by-Side System?
Jurisdictions may need to update their domestic legislation in order to give effect to the SbSS in order to effectively prevent their IIR and UTPR from applying to US-headquartered groups. The OECD suggests that legislation should be passed that applies on a retroactive basis from 1 January 2026, or, if retroactive legislation cannot be passed, prospective legislation should be passed as soon as practicable.
The SbSS applies in respect of financial years commencing on or after 1 January 2026. Therefore, MNE groups with 31 December year ends should immediately be able to take advantage of the SbSS, while those with 31 March or 30 June year ends will be slightly delayed.
5. What does this mean for provisioning?
Generally, the 2025 tax provision for groups with a 31 December year-end should not need to be adjusted, as the SbSS applies on a prospective basis. Therefore, accounts currently being closed do not need to be adjusted.
We generally expect the Q1 and Q2 2026 provisions to be prepared on the basis that the IIR and UTPR continue to apply to US-headquartered groups, until such time as the relevant jurisdiction substantively enacts legislation to give effect to the SbSS at which point top-up tax accruals in respect of an IIR or UTPR can be unwound for groups with 31 December year ends. Groups with 31 March or 30 June year ends would continue to accrue top-up tax under an IIR or UTPR until their next financial year, assuming SbSS legislation has been substantively enacted at that point.
MNE groups will need to identify top-up tax driven by an IIR or UTPR and monitor that jurisdiction’s SbSS implementation status in order to ensure the tax provision is appropriate.
6. Will the SbSS override QDMTTs?
No, the operation of QDMTTs will be largely unaffected by the SbSS. This means that US-headquartered groups will continue to be subjected to QDMTTs in the jurisdictions in which they have been implemented.
The SbSS has made clear that, in computing top-up tax under a QDMTT, the QDMTT must not treat CFC taxes or taxes allocated from a head office to a branch as Covered Taxes, or otherwise provide credit for these taxes.
Therefore, where a jurisdiction has implemented a QDMTT, the SbSS is unlikely to significantly impact the overall amount of top-up tax to be collected, except in respect of switch-off rule scenarios.
7. What are switch-off rules and how do they interact with the SbSS?
A jurisdiction can choose to “switch-off” its QDMTT in respect of certain types of entity. Under a switch-off rule the jurisdiction that implements the QDMTT will not collect top-up tax in respect of those entity types. For example, Hong Kong and Singapore do not collect top-up tax in respect of investment entities.
Where a switch-off rule applies to an entity, even though the QDMTT will not apply, it may still be subject to an IIR or UTPR, such that top-up tax is still collected in respect of that entity. However, if the entity is part of a US-headquartered group, the SbSS should apply, such that top-up tax will not be collected under an IIR or UTPR. This could mean that entities that are located in QDMTT jurisdictions that apply switch-off rules are subject to less top-up tax than those that do not apply switch-off rules.
Switch-off rules apply in discreet scenarios, in particular in respect of investment entities and joint ventures. Where a switch-off rule applies in respect of a joint venture, only the top-up tax relating to the US-headquartered group will be protected from IIRs and UTPRs.
Neither Hong Kong nor Singapore use switch-off rules to prevent top-up tax being collected in respect of joint ventures.
8. Can Hong Kong switch off the QDMTT for US-headquartered groups while continuing to apply it for non-US-headquartered groups?
The IF appears to have considered that jurisdictions may adjust their legislation so that US-headquartered groups are not subject to a QDMTT while non-US-headquartered groups continue to be subject to a QDMTT.
If a jurisdiction chooses to adjust its tax law to apply in this manner it will not be considered as qualified for the purposes of the QDMTT definition. It is also possible that the tax charged upon non-US-headquartered groups will not be considered to meet the definition of Covered Taxes, meaning that MNE groups operating in that location could suffer double taxation, firstly through domestically collected taxes and secondly through top-up tax collected under an IIR or UTPR by another jurisdiction.
MNE groups will need to carefully consider their tax positions in such territories, which are more likely to be tax haven jurisdictions.